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UPDATING ANDERSON-BURDICK TO EVALUATE PARTISAN
ELECTION MANIPULATION
Andrew Vazquez*
This Article analyzes jurisprudence concerning the judicial
review of election laws. It suggests that the United States Supreme
Court’s approach should acknowledge the realities of political
partisanship when reviewing challenged laws and regulations.
Specifically, this Article proposes a judicial test to evaluate election
laws for partisan biases using factors modeled on those employed
by the Court in Gingles v. Thornburg. Simply put, the manipulation
of election laws to pursue partisan advantages poses the greatest
threat to our democracy. Accordingly, this Article concludes that
protecting our democracy from election practices that falsely benefit
one party over another in the guise of administrative ease or
neutrality is paramount to maintaining fair and meaningful
elections.
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INTRODUCTION
The right to vote is the bedrock of a democratic society. In
the United States, courts must ensure that the right to vote is equally
accessible to all citizens and that states administer elections without
partisan favoritism.1 Over the last several decades, however, the
U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has greatly deferred to the
states’ authority to administer elections. 2 In doing so, the Court has
sanctioned states’ use of weak justifications for burdening the right
to vote while ignoring socio-economic, political, and historical
factors such as the relevant political landscape.
The current judicial framework for analyzing challenges to
election laws originates from Anderson v. Celebrezze3 and Burdick
v. Takushi.4 This framework, commonly known as the AndersonBurdick test, balances a plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights against a state’s interest in conducting an election. The
Anderson-Burdick test’s weaknesses, however, are particularly
evident when considering political entrenchment 5 and structural
burdens on political expression. This Article proposes an alternative
framework to address barriers to the right to vote that give the
dominant political parties electoral advantages over their opponents.
This proposal draws inspiration from the “Senate factors”
formulated in Thornburg v. Gingles.6 In Gingles, the Court
identified nine factors for courts to consider in challenges to election
laws under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”).7
This Article’s proposed framework attempts to incorporate the
actual and existing political context to the judiciary’s burden
analysis when reviewing claims that affect the right to vote. The
proposed test accomplishes two things. First, it facilitates judicial
analysis of difficult-to-analyze structural issues in election
administration.
Second, the test prevents unfair electoral
manipulation by legislators—or other bad-faith state actors—by
scrutinizing the political impacts of election laws.
———————————————————————————
H. Goldfeder, Jason D’Andrea, and Robin Fisher for their endless efforts to aid in
the pursuit of my passion.
1
This Article recognizes that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that partisan
gerrymandering is a non-justiciable political question. See Rucho v. Common
Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). Thus, this Article does not discuss the particular
issue.
2
See Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court’s Pro-Partisanship Turn, 109 GEO.
ONLINE L. J. 50, 51 (2020).
3
460 U.S. 780 (1983).
4
504 U.S. 428 (1992).
5
This Article defines “political entrenchment” as the way incumbents use election
laws to maintain their positions in anti-democratic ways—such as restricting
access to vote for certain groups and making it more difficult for challengers to
run.
6
See 478 U.S. 30, 36-37 (1986) (citing S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982)).
7
52 U.S.C. § 10301.
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Part I of this Article analyzes the criticisms and failings of
the Anderson-Burdick test as it is currently applied. Part II then
examines the Senate factors established in Gingles and discusses the
benefits of its multi-factor framework as applied to relevant political
analysis. Lastly, Part III outlines the proposed test and provides
examples of its potential application from prior Supreme Court
cases.
I. CRITICISMS OF ANDERSON-BURDICK AND CONSIDERATIONS OF
ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES FROM A STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE
The Supreme Court devised the Anderson-Burdick test to
balance the competing interests of an individual’s right to vote
against the state’s justifications for burdening that right through the
challenged law or regulation.8 In Anderson, the Court held that, in
evaluating a state’s election regulations, a court must first assess the
“character and magnitude” of the declared injury to the rights
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the
challenger seeks to vindicate. 9 If the burden is severe, courts apply
strict scrutiny—requiring that the imposition must be necessary to
serve the state’s compelling interest.10 On the other hand, if the
burden is not severe, which is more often the case,11 then judicial
scrutiny is more relaxed. In this situation, the court evaluates the
strength of the state’s interests the challenged restriction purports to
serve and considers the state’s justifications for imposing such a
burden. Lastly, the reviewing court then considers “the extent to
which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s
rights.”12 Essentially, the test weighs the challenger’s First and
Fourteenth Amendment right to vote against the state’s interest in
implementing the subjected law or regulation. To this end, the party
with the weightier interest prevails.
Many scholars have criticized the Anderson-Burdick test,
arguing that it affords too much deference to the states and ignores
the political impacts of challenged laws.13 For example, courts often
adopt, with little skepticism, a state’s vague justifications—such as
———————————————————————————
8

See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
Id.
10
Id.
11
Joshua A. Douglas, A Vote for Clarity: Updating the Supreme Court’s Severe
Burden Test for State Election Regulations That Adversely Impact an Individual’s
Right to Vote, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 372, 382-86 (2007).
12
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
13
See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation:
New Pressures for a Structural Theory of the Right to Vote, 35 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 643 (2008); Matthew R. Pikor, Voter ID in Wisconsin: A Better Approach
to Anderson/Burdick Balancing, 10 SEVENTH CIR. REV. 465 (2015); Douglas,
supra note 11; Lowell J. Schiller, Recent Development, Imposing Necessary
Boundaries on Judicial Discretion in Ballot Access Cases: Clingman v. Beaver,
125 S. Ct. 2029 (2005), 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 331 (2005).
9
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“preventing voter confusion” or “efficient election administration”
to permit voting restrictions.14 And even when a more specific
justification is proffered, such as combating a particular kind of
voter fraud, courts have not required states to produce empirical
evidence when evaluating the legitimacy of the state’s rationale.15
By contrast, the Court has found that when a plaintiff lacks empirical
evidence to support their challenge, this absence weighs heavily
against finding for the plaintiff.16 As a result, the state virtually
always meets its burden of showing a valid rationale for burdening
the right to vote.
The flaws of the Anderson-Burdick test are particularly
evident in cases concerning structural barriers and partisan
entrenchment. Burdick, the other case from which the test was
created, provides an example of the test’s failure to guide courts
through a thorough analysis of statutory schemes and socio-political
factors that operate to effectively entrench the power of a given
political party.
Burdick involved a challenge to Hawaii’s ban on write-in
voting, which prohibited voters from casting votes for candidates
not named on the ballot.17 A voter sued the state requesting the
opportunity to vote for candidates not listed on ballots in future
elections.18 The Supreme Court upheld the law, finding that the
state’s regulatory interest outweighed the First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of Hawaiian voters.19 In analyzing the “character
and magnitude” of the burden on the voter’s First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, Justice White, writing for a plurality,
characterized the right to vote via write-in as merely a “generalized
expressive function,” rather than having any value to the electoral
process.20 A write-in, the Court opined, is simply an individual
interest whose prohibition was justified by the need to run a stable
election process.21
This assessment, however, ignored the existing political
dynamic in Hawaii, resulting in a decision that suppressed political
———————————————————————————
See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-95 (1986) (“We have
never required a State to make a particularized showing of the existence of voter
confusion, ballot overcrowding, or the presence of frivolous candidacies prior to
the imposition of reasonable restrictions on ballot access.”).
15
See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 198-200 (2008). See
also Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 750 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 573 U.S.
913 (2015).
16
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442,
457 (2008) (ruling that the plaintiffs’ failure to show evidence of voter confusion
prevented a successful challenge).
17
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 428-30.
18
Id. at 441-42.
19
Id. at 441.
20
Id. at 438.
21
Id.
14
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competitiveness.22 At the time of the decision, and for all practical
purposes, Hawaii was a one-party state: Democrats dominated
political life and dictated public policy at all levels.23 Additionally,
Hawaii’s laws made it difficult for third parties and independent
candidates to garner the political support sufficient to place their
names on the ballot, effectively cutting off any opportunity for
winning an election.24 These restrictions were compounded by the
fact that the winner of the Democratic Party primary inevitably won
the general election. 25 In a searing article on the issue, Professors
Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes analyzed it this way:
Although write-in ballots are not always necessary
for mobilizing political opposition, in Hawaii the
write-in option is particularly significant because
other avenues for opposition are so effectively closed
off. Around a third of general election races for the
state legislature are uncontested, and in these
uncontested races substantial numbers of voters who
vote for other seats refuse to cast an affirmative vote.
Instead, they leave their ballots blank. . . . The ban
on write-in votes prevents this disaffection from
coalescing behind a specific alternative candidate to
the choice of the Democratic Party. 26
As Issacharoff and Pildes point out, Hawaii’s justifications
for banning write-in votes—the prevention of “party raiding”27 and
“unrestrained factionalism”28—serve the interests of the dominant
political party, the Democrats.29 Indeed, the state officials who
created these restrictions were Democrats themselves, and, as
Issacharoff and Pildes suggest, it entrenched their power against
competition.30 Exacerbating the ban on write-ins were restrictive
procedures for getting on the ballot or switching parties to vote in
closed primaries, making it extremely difficult for insurgents or
dissidents to challenge the hegemony of the Democratic Party. 31
———————————————————————————
22

Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups
of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 670-73 (1998) (“A political
process case more wrongly decided than Burdick is difficult to imagine.”).
23
See id.
24
See id.
25
See id. at 671.
26
Id. at 672.
27
Id. at 673, n.115 (noting that the Court defined “party raiding” as one party’s
efforts to “switch a bloc of voters from one party to another” to change the
election’s outcome).
28
Id. at 673, n.116 (noting that the Court discussed the state’s interest in
“preventing write-in votes.”).
29
Id. at 673.
30
See id.
31
See id.
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This Court’s use of the Anderson-Burdick test necessarily failed to
analyze the interplay between the socio-economic, political, and
historical factors behind the law’s implementation and
mischaracterized the burdens on political competition.32 The test
allows states to devise post hoc justifications for laws that work to
the personal and partisan benefit of the legislators writing them
without significant judicial scrutiny.
One significant issue in election administration is for
political motives to unduly influence statutory creation, resulting in
the entrenchment of political parties and protection of incumbents.
Such partisan-driven rules that dictate how elections operate are
dangerous for democracy. These rules allow incumbents to entrench
themselves in power, which undermines the competitiveness of our
democratic system.33 For elections to be free and fair, partisan
advantage must not taint election administration or prevent voting.
Indeed, Justice O’Connor noted the tension between election
administration and partisan officials that oversee elections in
Clingman v. Beaver:
[I]t must be recognized that [the State] is not a wholly
independent or neutral arbiter. Rather, the State is
itself controlled by the political party or parties in
power, which presumably have an incentive to shape
the rules of the electoral game. . . . Where the State
imposes only reasonable and genuinely neutral
restrictions on associational rights, there is no threat
to the integrity of the electoral process and no
apparent reason for judicial intervention. As such
restrictions become more severe . . . there is
increasing cause for concern that those in power may
be using electoral rules to erect barriers to electoral
competition. In such cases, applying heightened
scrutiny helps to ensure that such limitations are truly
justified and that the State’s asserted interests are not
merely a pretext for exclusionary or anticompetitive
restrictions.34
It is antithetical to democracy to defer to elected officials’
partisan interests to structure elections to their political advantage.
In election law, it is crucial for courts to consider the maxim that
Justice O’Connor articulates—that the state is made up of partisan
officials with potentially perverse incentives to craft election laws
in their favor. Justice O’Connor recognized that election laws made
by political actors should be highly scrutinized. Thus, for elections
———————————————————————————
32

See id.
See generally id.
34
Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 603 (2005).
33
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to be truly free and fair, courts must protect against partisan
manipulation.
II. SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE ADVANTAGES
OF THE NINE SENATE FACTORS
Section 2 of the VRA provides plaintiffs with another way
to challenge election laws.35 Adopted as an enforcement mechanism
for the Fifteenth Amendment, 36 Section 2 allows voters to seek
judicial relief if a state or local law has denied or limited their right
to vote on the basis of race, color, or language.37 When evaluating
claims under this law, courts have used the following Senate factors
articulated in Thornburg v. Gingles:38
1. the
history
of
official
voting-related
discrimination in the state or political subdivision;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the
state or political subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political
subdivision has used voting practices or procedures
that tend to enhance the opportunity for
discrimination against the minority group, such as
unusually large election districts, majority-vote
requirements, and prohibitions against bullet voting;
4. the exclusion of members of the minority group
from candidate slating processes;
5. the extent to which minority group members bear
the effects of discrimination in areas such as
education, employment, and health, which hinder
their ability to participate effectively in the political
process;
6. the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political
campaigns;
———————————————————————————
“No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State . . . in a manner which results
in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race or color . . . .” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a).
36
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §§1-2.
37
See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). Specifically, Section 2 has given rise to “vote
dilution” claims where minority challengers claim that their electoral power is
diluted by the structure of the electoral process. See Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt/section-2-voting-rights-act
[https://perma.cc/6RH7-ZLS3] (last visited Oct. 22. 2022).
38
478 U.S. 30 (1986).
35
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7. the extent to which members of the minority
group have been elected to public office in the
jurisdiction;
8. whether there is a lack of responsiveness on the
part of elected officials to the particularized needs of
minority group members; and
9. the tenuousness of state justifications.39
These factors offer a better framework for evaluating the
constitutionality of election laws—especially as it relates to political
competitiveness and the political power of minority groups. First,
Section 2 challenges are evaluated through a “results-based” test,
which allows courts to find a violation if the election structure
results in the dilution of minority voting power. 40 This contrasts
with claims brought under the Equal Protection Clause, which
requires discriminatory intent to deem facially neutral laws
unconstitutionally racially discriminatory.41
Second, the Senate factors address the historical context of a
jurisdiction.42 Notably, jurisdictions with a history of racially
discriminatory election laws and practices are heavily scrutinized.
Courts evaluating Section 2 claims can adopt the fact findings of
prior court opinions, which creates a narrative regarding the political
history.43 While the Anderson-Burdick test permits courts to
evaluate a law abstractly and in a historical vacuum, the Senate
factors force courts to review claims in light of history.44
Third, these factors also consider how the lingering effects
of racism cause socio-economic disparities among minority groups
and how they affect access to political power.45 This consideration
has proven incredibly important, as burdens on the right to vote are
much more likely to affect socio-economically disadvantaged

———————————————————————————
Id. at 36-38. The “Senate factors” take their name from the Senate Judiciary
Committee’s report concerning the 1982 VRA amendments to Section 2. See S.
REP. NO. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982). This Article, however, does not address the
three “preconditions” for challenges under Section 2.
40
See Daniel P. Tokaji, Applying Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, 50 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 439, 442-43 (2015).
41
See, e.g., Personnel Adm’r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
(1979).
42
S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28-29.
43
See Deuel Ross, Pouring Old Poison into New Bottles: How Discretion and
the Discriminatory Administration of Voter ID Laws Recreate Literacy Tests, 45
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 362, 425-25 (2014).
44
Cf. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 22, at 671 (discussing Hawaii’s ban on
write-in voting upheld in Burdick in the context of the statutory scheme as a
whole).
45
S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28-29.
39
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groups and result in racially disparate impacts.46 Many courts have
acknowledged that lower socio-economic status hinders a minority
group’s ability to participate effectively in the political process. 47
Such an analysis of a challenged election law can benefit a court
attempting to reveal the law’s real-life impacts.
This mode of analysis should replace the Anderson-Burdick
test for analyzing election structures. Indeed, the Senate factors
provide critical considerations for courts when reviewing election
laws, allowing them to examine the actual political impacts a law
has on the political system.
III. REVISING THE SENATE FACTORS AND ANDERSON-BURDICK TO
ADDRESS WEAKNESSES IN ANALYSIS OF ELECTION LAWS
Considering the inadequacy of the Anderson-Burdick test in
addressing the impact of election laws on existing political
dynamics, courts should utilize a flexible framework similar to the
Senate factors to analyze the burdens created by laws. Accordingly,
this Article proposes a new test which will add steps to the
Anderson-Burdick framework. The test is as follows:
1. Plaintiffs must show that the challenged standard,
process, procedure, or statutory scheme burdens the
right to vote or access to the ballot under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.
2. The State must then offer justifications for
burdening the right to vote and/or access to the ballot
through the challenged standard, process, procedure,
or statutory scheme.
3. Courts then analyze whether the burden of the
challenged law interacts with social, economic,
partisan, structural, or historical conditions to
provide the political party in power or incumbents
with imbalanced electoral advantages.
4. If the reviewing court finds that the factors in step
three show that the challenged law gives an electoral
advantage to the political party in power or
———————————————————————————
The Supreme Court explained that the “essence of a Section 2 claim is that a
certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical
conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white
voters to elect their preferred representatives.” Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S.
30, 47 (1986). See also Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
47
Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM
643 (2006).
46
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incumbents generally, then it applies strict scrutiny
to evaluate the law.
This analysis provides courts with a more flexible
framework to determine if a law or regulation gives a systemic
electoral advantage to the political party or incumbents in power.
Specifically, courts should consider the following non-exclusive list
of factors.
A. The History of Disenfranchisement and Politics in the
Jurisdiction
First, courts must analyze the history of voter
disenfranchisement and the politics of the jurisdiction from which
the challenge originates. If, for example, the challenged regulation
is at the county level, then a historical review should include the past
practices of that jurisdiction—as well as those from the state—to
provide an accurate context for the regulation. As with Section 2
challenges, courts should also take fact findings from previous
rulings that have established whether past practices show a trend of
voter disenfranchisement. If the court finds a history of voter
disenfranchisement in the jurisdiction, it should review the
regulation with more skepticism. This is especially important if
concentrated disenfranchisement arises in constitutionally protected
classes.
Furthermore, courts must consider the political history of the
jurisdiction. Take New York, for example, a state known for its
recent domination by the Democratic Party.48 Even where control
of the state government was split between Republicans and
Democrats, the two parties have focused on preventing competition
from primary challengers. As a result, New York State is notorious
for cumbersome ballot access laws that make it difficult for
challengers to get on the ballot.49 Candidates not supported by the
leadership in their respective parties find it much harder to challenge
incumbents or party-endorsed candidates. Thus, for example, a
court evaluating an action challenging a New York State ballot
access law should consider this political history when evaluating
whether the law is overly disadvantageous to insurgents, and
therefore, potentially unconstitutional.
———————————————————————————
48

See generally Party Control of New York State Government, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Party_control_of_New_York_state_government [https://
perma.cc/T2BQ-YQLA] (last visited Oct. 22, 2022).
49
See generally Katherine E. Schuelke, Note, A Call for Reform of New York
State’s Ballot Access Laws, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 182 (1989). See also DeNora
Getachew, Understanding the Labyrinth: New York’s Ballot Access Laws,
GOTHAM GAZETTE, https://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/advertise/252understanding-the-labyrinth-new-yorks-ballot-access-laws [https://perma.cc
/VU56-SN6E] (last visited Oct. 23, 2022).
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B. Partisanship and Incumbency Protection in the Creation and
Implementation of Laws
The second factor that courts should examine is the political
context of a law’s creation and implementation. Laws are inherently
suspect when they burden the right to vote for a certain subset of
people because of their political affiliations. Without looking at the
political impact of a law, a court cannot accurately assess how it
might unfairly monopolize the electoral process for an alreadydominant political party.
A reviewing court should consider a variety of evidence
surrounding the political circumstances of a statute’s creation. One
type of evidence to consider is the process of the law’s passage—
including its legislative record, the statements of party officials
concerning its purpose or intent, and the partisan voting record. And
even if this law passed in a bipartisan manner, courts should ask
whether it intended to protect incumbents against challengers.
Courts should also consider the law’s practical effect law on
the electorate. If a law works to restrict one party or group from
voting, then that may be evidence of partisan motivation. Moreover,
courts should ask whether this policy exists in other states, and, if
so, what the effects are on that state’s electorate. Specifically, courts
should consider which party implemented the law in those states,
and whether any invidious intent sheds light on partisan motivations
in the challenged jurisdictions.
Voter identification laws illustrate how this analytical
framework might be applied to protect voting rights more
effectively. A common critique of voter identification laws is
partisanship motivates their implementation.50 Indeed, several
members of the Republican Party have stated that voter
identification laws are intended to increase their chances of winning
elections.51
The Supreme Court, however, barely acknowledged this
reality in Crawford v. Marion County Board of Elections.52 In a
lower court decision, a dissenting judge in the Seventh Circuit
characterized Indiana’s voter identification law, at issue in
Crawford, as “a not too-thinly-veiled attempt to discourage electionday turnout by certain folks believed to skew Democratic.” 53 Oddly,
Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, stated that partisan
———————————————————————————
50

See Pikor, supra note 13, at 497-98.
Michael Wines, Some Republicans Acknowledge Leveraging Voter ID Laws for
Political Gain, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09
/17/us/some-republicans-acknowledge-leveraging-voter-id-laws-for-politicalgain.html [https://perma.cc/ZWX2-RBX9].
52
553 U.S 181 (2008).
53
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007)
(Evans, J., dissenting).
51
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advantages are valid motivations for passing election laws so long
as other motivations exist.54 And while Justice Stevens’s opinion
declared that the prevention of voter fraud, in part, was a sufficient
state justification, there was no evidence whatsoever of voter fraud
in Indiana.55
In Frank v. Walker,56 the Seventh Circuit reversed a district
court’s decision that Wisconsin’s voter identification law violated
both the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the VRA.57 The
challenged law required voters to present one of nine forms of photo
identification to have their votes counted. 58 But the Seventh Circuit
upheld the law as constitutional without any analysis of the political
climate in Wisconsin.59
Instead, the court should have considered the partisanship
behind the law’s enactment. In the law’s passage, Wisconsin
legislators split along party lines. Republican legislators voted
unanimously for the law; Democrats united against it.60 This fact
should certainly have been considered, taking such evidence into
account when considering a state’s proffered justifications because
they may be suspect in light of this evidence. Instead, Frank is just
one example of Crawford’s effect of giving the green light to
jurisdictions to implement—and entrench—partisan advantages.
C. The Importance of the Challenged Statute to the
Competitiveness of Elections in the Jurisdiction
Another issue for courts is the importance of the challenged
law or regulation to the overall administration of elections. Some
processes and regulations bear more heavily and directly than others
upon the right to vote. For example, the length of time that polls are
open, the qualifications needed to vote, the process for counting
votes, and subsequent challenges are all integral to the process. A
process deemed critical should be subject to a heightened level of
review and require more compelling governmental justifications. A
court can determine how important a procedure is by its effect on
overall voter turnout and electoral competitiveness.
———————————————————————————
“It is fair to infer that partisan considerations may have played a significant role
in the decision to enact [the law]. If such considerations had provided the only
justification for a photo identification requirement . . . [the law] would suffer the
same fate as . . . poll tax[es]. . . . But if a nondiscriminatory law is supported by
valid neutral justifications, those justifications should not be disregarded simply
because partisan interests may have provided one motivation for the votes of
individual legislators.” Id. at 203-04.
55
Id. at 194-97.
56
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How critical a procedure is to elections in a particular
jurisdiction can vary with its political context. Take the example
provided by Burdick in Part I, where Hawaii law banned write-in
voting.61 While Justice White noted that write-ins have a
“generalized expressive function,”62 he failed to consider the
political context of the state. Write-in voting served as the only
potential option for voters to coalesce around an independent
candidate against the Democratic Party’s dominance over Hawaiian
politics.63 Because of Hawaii’s political landscape, the write-in
ballot served as a more critical procedure in the electoral process
than in other states. Accordingly, the Burdick Court should have
viewed the state’s attempt to outlaw write-ins with more skepticism.
D. The Weight of the Burden on the Right to Vote and on Which
Subset of People the Burden Falls
Another factor for courts to consider is the weight of the
burden on the right to vote, and upon which subset of people the
burden falls. This factor focuses a court’s analysis on the burdens
on the right to vote or access to the ballot on a jurisdiction’s most
marginalized populations. The Supreme Court has focused on the
burden as it applies to the entire voting population in a jurisdiction;
however, the focus should be narrowed to the population of voters
most heavily burdened. If the Court adopted this approach, political
motivations that led to these laws would be more likely to reveal
themselves.
For example, the varying opinions in Crawford addressed on
whom the burden of Indiana’s voter identification law fell.64 There,
the challenger argued that the Court should look at the subset of the
population most burdened by the challenged law.65 Justice Stevens
rejected this argument, framing it as “a unique balancing analysis
that looks specifically at a small number of voters who may
experience a special burden under the statute.” 66 He emphasized
that nothing in the record supported the claim that the law would
burden indigent voters.67
To ignore the fact that voter identification laws affect a very
specific subset of the population who are unlikely to vote for the
Republican Party is to ignore political reality. Many studies have
shown that the burden of voter identification laws falls
disproportionately on minorities and the poor, two heavily
———————————————————————————
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Democratic demographics.68 Justice Souter, in dissent, noted that
the burden would fall most heavily on the poor.69 He did not,
however, address the likely partisanship of this demographic. 70
This failure to accurately evaluate upon whom the burden of
the Indiana law fell constituted a deficient analysis. On the other
hand, applying this Article’s proposed framework would allow
plaintiffs to present expert testimony about the likely socioeconomic impact, showing that vulnerable populations may be
prevented from voting or that the cost of voting would likely
increase under the law. This would undoubtedly help courts focus
on how an election law may adversely impact the political landscape
in a particular jurisdiction.
E. The Challenged Statute’s Interaction with Other Statutes
In her concurrence in Clingman v. Beaver,71 Justice
O’Connor articulated how the interplay of multiple statutes in
election law is crucial to judicial analysis:
A panoply of regulations, each apparently defensible
when considered alone, may nevertheless have the
combined effect of severely restricting participation
and competition. Even if each part of a regulatory
regime might be upheld if challenged separately, one
or another of these parts might have to fall if the
overall scheme unreasonably curtails associational
freedoms.72
As Justice O’Connor asserts, individual election laws may not by
themselves fail to pass constitutional muster. The law’s impact,
however, can often only be assessed when related statutes are
reviewed as well.
The Burdick case again provides an important lesson.
Looking at the write-in ballot in a vacuum, a court could conclude
that it serves merely a “generalized expressive function,” as Justice
———————————————————————————
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White did.73 In conjunction with Hawaii’s panoply of election laws
and the existing political landscape, however, the law banning writein voting essentially acts as a barrier for candidates outside of the
Democratic Party. This is much more burdensome on associational
rights than Justice White’ characterization and more of an accurate
picture of the effect of the law.
F. The Tenuousness of State Justifications
As with the Gingles factors, “the tenuousness of the
justification for a state policy [regarding an election law] may
indicate that the policy is unfair.”74 In the context of Section 2 of
the VRA, courts have found that a state’s justifications for
challenged laws are tenuous when they are (1) false, (2)
impermissible, or (3) outweighed by other considerations.75 States
often attempt to justify election laws as either important for
“political stability” or to prevent “party raiding” or “voter
confusion.”76 Courts should thus look at such conclusory and often
meaningless rationales with skepticism.
CONCLUSION
If a court finds that an election law provides an electoral
advantage to the dominant party in the jurisdiction, then it should
apply “strict scrutiny” to assess its constitutionality. Although strict
scrutiny is usually applied to cases involving racially discriminatory
government policies, it should be applied here as well because
courts must similarly protect against partisan electoral manipulation.
Protecting our democracy from election practices that benefit one
party over another in the guise of administrative ease or neutrality is
paramount to maintaining fair and meaningful elections. Only when
such laws are genuinely justified by a compelling governmental
interest and narrowly tailored to meet that interest should the court
find them constitutional.
The manipulation of election laws to pursue partisan
advantages poses the greatest threat to our democracy. Elected
officials passing laws across the country that restrict the right to vote
to maintain power threaten the future of democracy. The judiciary
is only one institution designed to protect our democracy, but it must
use the appropriate tools to do so.
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